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 Chapter 10: Risk Management and Control Procedures 
 
TAKE CALCULATED RISKS. THAT IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM BEING RASH. 
George S. Patton  (1885 1945) 
 
WE ARE ALL CONTROLLED BY THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE, 
AND PART OF THAT WORLD HAS BEEN AND WILL BE 
CONSTRUCTED BY MEN. THE QUESTION IS THIS: ARE WE 
TO BE CONTROLLED BY ACCIDENTS, BY TYRANTS, OR 
BY OURSELVES IN EFFECTIVE CULTURAL DESIGN?  
   B.F. Skinner  (1904 - 1990) 
 
 
Organizations considering cashflow reengineering are often concerned about the business risks in 
changing the patterns and procedures of their operations, some of which may have been in place for 
many years. A particular anxiety is that, in outsourcing activities to a vendor, there may be less focus 
than the company provides for the timely completion of important tasks. Managers fear that 
constituent groups, including customers, suppliers, creditors, employees and shareholders, may be 
negatively affected by reengineering initiatives. 
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Managers often fail to appreciate the extent of risk in normal business operations, due to the fact that 
much risk in inherent in any transaction. We simply do not see risk because it is everywhere,  
Categories of risk include the following:1 
 
 Trading partner, credit or payment finality risk. The risk of a customer's failure to pay or that 
final credit for a payment will be withdrawn due to that party's actions. The management of 
this risk was discussed in Chapter 9. 
 Treasury operation or fraud risk. The risk of the theft or loss of funds, discussed throughout 
this chapter. 
 Bank settlement risk. The risk that a bank handling your transactions will fail, discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
 Information risk. The risk of the loss of data critical to the operation of your business, 
discussed in this chapter. 
                               
1See R. Balaporia, V. Hruska and B. Pisapia, "Payables and Receivables: Keeping Risk 
Down as Technology Options Soar," TMA Journal, September-October 1994, pages 20-28, for a 
discussion of procedures at Pacific Telesis and Occidental Petroleum. 
 Financial risk. The risk that the use of derivative financial instruments will result in large 
losses due to adverse moves in interest or currency exchange rates.  Financial risk is 
discussed in the Appendix to this chapter. 
 Systemic risk. The risk of the collapse of the payment system, possibly triggered by some 
cataclysmic event  This risk is monitored by various U.S. and global government agencies.. 
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The explicit definition and categorization of risk is a necessary step in its effective management. The 
advantage of reengineering is that activities are under the proverbial "microscope" of management on 
an constant basis, rather than assumed as satisfactory or ignored in the absence of reengineering. In 
fact, this is effectively the essence of Principle X, discussed in Chapter 3, in that the job of 
management is the continual exploration of opportunities to improve the performance of the 
organization. This chapter discusses the primary business risks of cashflow activities: the risk of 
fraud and information risks. The management of these risks is reviewed by actions internal to the 
organization and through outsourcing. 
 
 
Risk and Cashflow Reengineering 
 
Business risk is pervasive because management's use of the scarce factors of production, land, labor 
and capital may result in a lesser return than would have been received if those factors were 
otherwise employed. The only rational way to deal with such risk is to analyze alternative courses of 
action continuously, and to select that action with the greatest return for an acceptable level of risk. If 
the risk-return relationship from a particular strategy changes, management must adjust its decision 
accordingly. 
 
For example, a reengineering strategy may be to outsource the collection of receipts to a bank for 
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comprehensive processing; see the discussion in Chapter 6. The decision may be based on 
economics, in that the bid price may be below the cost of internal processing; it may be based on 
service and quality issues, in that the bank may offer superior service to that available internally; or it 
may result from other factors.  
 
The manager would constantly monitor the performance of the bank to determine that the quality, 
service and price are as promised. Should any important factors deteriorate, the manager would be 
justified in pursuing corrective steps, possibly including terminating the service. Such remedies 
should be stated in the original contract or purchase agreement between the bank and the corporation. 
 
Managers may well wonder as to the logic of outsourcing a function if such constant scrutiny is 
required, given the concern for offending any constituent group by a performance failure. However, 
business risk is always present regardless of whether an activity is conducted internally or externally, 
and the job of the manager is to monitor risk and manage it on behalf of the organization. 
 
 
 
The Risk of Fraud: Internal Actions 
 
Risk is integral to the responsibilities of the Treasurer, the position in a business designated to 
safeguard its cash and other assets. However, every manager with responsibility for cashflow 
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elements must be cognizant of the various risks related to those activities, and must be prepared to 
take action to manage the risks along with other organizational tasks. A primary cashflow risk is 
fraud, with an estimated 500 million checks are forged annually causing total losses in the billions of 
dollars.  
 
The potential for check fraud has been increased recently with the issuance of the Federal Reserve 
Board's Regulation CC, requiring banks to grant access to deposits in two days for checks drawn on 
local banks and five days for non-local items. These requirements have caused bad checks to be 
honored by banks in some cases before they can show up as return items. 
 
Our consulting engagements frequently uncover incidents of fraud and theft. For example, an 
insurance company issued a check in settlement of a claim for $70. It was altered to $70,000 using 
desk-top publishing technology, presented and cleared through the banking system, and not found by 
accounting clerks until three months had passed. When attempts were made to contact the depositor 
of the check, he had disappeared, to no one's surprise.  
 
Fraud can be prevented by various initiatives internal to the organization. The material which follows 
discusses paper transactions and electronic transactions, as does the subsequent section on 
outsourcing.  
 
Consider these internal actions to manage paper transaction fraud: 
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VERIFY THE VENDORS USED FOR PURCHASING. Fraud often occurs through the payment of 
invoices to phoney vendors and/or vendors who overcharge for their products and services. 
Every vendor should be paid off an approved list, maintained and changed by a senior manager 
totally independent of the payables and disbursement functions.  Exceptions should be rare, and 
should require multiple approvals. Verification of the legitimacy of a vendor can be through any of 
the following: 
 
 Require the vendor to provide a Federal tax identification number 
 Conduct a credit check on the vendor with a credit agency 
 Request some basic financial data, preferably obtaining an audited statement 
 Visit the new vendor's premises 
 Ask the vendor for names of corporate customers, and call those businesses both to 
determine quality of service and legitimacy 
 
USE BLANK CHECK STOCK OR SAFETY PAPER. Companies often order up to a six months 
supply of pre-printed check stock. This inventory, possibly tens of thousands of checks, is 
stored in a warehouse area with current requirements sent to the check printing site, often a computer 
facility. Once those boxes of printed checks are placed in their holding bins, it becomes impossible 
to protect against theft.  
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It is a relatively simple matter for anyone with access to the check printing or storage area to steal 
several checks from the middle or bottom of a box of checks, and months may pass before anyone is 
aware of the theft. Inexpensive laser technology allows the entire check face, including the magnetic 
ink character recognition (or MICR) line to be printed on blank paper. Alternatively, use safety or 
watermark paper, made from multiple layers of colored fibers, to cause scarring or bleeding when 
erased or chemically altered. 
 
SECURE SIGNATURE PLATES. Due to the number of checks produced by businesses, a 
signature plate may be used to "sign" each check. Many companies fail to protect signature 
plates when not in use, leaving them on the check signing machine during business hours or in a 
known, unlocked drawer. Signature plates should be secured in a locked facility when not in use. 
Whenever possible, wet (ink) sign checks, particularly those over a predetermined minimum (such as 
$1,000), and so indicate that requirement to the drawee bank and on the check face. 
 
ELIMINATE CHECK SIGNING BY SIGNATURE PLATE. Either use printed letter for the signature, 
surrounded by such unique characters as Greek letters or typographical marks, or scan the 
signature by computer scanner onto the laser-printed check. Scanned signatures can be printed using 
various color combinations to make it more difficult to copy. By eliminating the check signing 
process, the potential for fraudulent signature plate is eliminated. 
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LIMIT THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED SIGNERS. Large corporations may have hundreds of 
authorized check signers on file with the bank, resulting from branch and other dispersed 
locations which often "require" signers for locally issued checks. A bank cannot verify checks signed 
by hundreds of different managers, and will simply honor any check presented.  Furthermore, 
organizations usually fail to delete authorized signers from bank signature cards, even though they 
may have departed years earlier. Carefully monitor the list of authorized signers, and notify the bank 
as soon as a change occurs on that list. 
 
ELIMINATE CHECK SIGNING BY SIGNATURE PLATE. Either use printed letters for the signature 
on the check, surrounded by unique characters (e.g., Greek letters, typography marks) or 
scan the signature into the signature line. Scanned signatures frequently are reproduced using various 
color combinations to make copying difficult. By eliminating the signing process, the potential for 
fraudulent use of a signature plate is eliminated. 
 
CENTRALIZE CHECK ISSUANCE. Avoid the opening of bank accounts at each facility of your 
organization for convenience, check encashment (cashing employee checks), or other 
reasons. All checks should be issued from one site under the management of a designated manager. 
Consider outsourcing the disbursement function to a bank or vendor by a daily transmission of your 
payables file, as discussed in Chapter 8. The bank/vendor will convert each payment to the 
appropriate form (check, ACH, EDI, wire transfer) and handle all movement of funds with the 
accompanying remittance advice. 
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WORK WITH LOCAL BANKS TO PREVENT PAYROLL CHECK FRAUD. A major source of fraud is 
the cashing of counterfeit payroll checks on a city's large employer, either at local banks or 
at other popular check cashing establishments (e.g., liquor stores). Local businesses should receive 
information as to identification cards issued to employees, including the position of the photograph, 
the color of the printing and the background, whether a fingerprint is on the card, etc. Similar 
information should be provided regarding company check stock. Furthermore, a telephone contact 
should be provided if there are questions regarding whether an employee or a check is legitimate. 
 
SECURE OVER-THE-WINDOW DEPOSITS. The physical delivery of a deposit of checks to the 
bank invites theft either by the employee or by an outsider. If you must have employees 
handle the deposit, have them bonded and require the reconciliation of the encoded and stamped 
bank deposit ticket with totals calculated from daily receipt processing. Be sure to alter the pattern of 
the trip to the bank, using different routes, going at varying times, and carrying the deposit in 
different bags or satchels. Don't let the trip be predictable to a waiting thief! 
 
SECURE ACCESS TO AREAS WHERE SENSITIVE OR VALUABLE ASSETS ARE MAINTAINED, such 
as Treasury, Information Systems, Payroll or Accounts Payable. Access to Treasury may 
permit the theft of check stock and unauthorized use of your bank information reporting systems to 
do a fraudulent wire transfer. Access to other business areas may permit the tampering with internal 
systems to issue checks to phoney vendors or for payroll. 
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SEPARATE TREASURY AND ACCOUNTING RESPONSIBILITIES. Smaller organizations frequently 
have the same individuals open mail, deposit checks, apply cash to open receivables, pay 
vendors and issue checks. This is becoming particularly prevalent as organizations downsize. With 
fewer employees verifying each other's activities, there are numerous opportunities for fraud and 
theft. The best prevention is to force the separation of those duties, and to require at least two 
different employees to handle the receipt and disbursement of cash. 
 
 
Electronic Transactions 
 
This section addresses electronic fraud involving wire transfers, ACH transfers, and EDI 
transactions. Wires are final, same day transfers. Once they're sent from your treasury shop, they are 
gone. ACH transfers are uniform next day settlement, and EDI transactions are value dated, allowing 
the transaction to be released on the date specified by the originator. Therefore, some opportunity is 
provided for the stop and recall of ACHs and EDIs after the transaction has been released. 
 
Because of the finality of wires, most security has been directed toward protection of that process, 
with much less concern for ACH and EDI. For example, most wire systems contain multiple levels 
of security, including initiation, verification and release.  
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Furthermore, ACH/EDI transfers were, until recently, a largely "closed loop", in that mainframe 
computer systems were required to create ACH transaction tapes, which were then couriered or data 
transmitted to the bank. Today, numerous banks offer personal computer terminal-based ACH/EDI 
capability, which offers flexibility to the user but vastly increases the opportunity for fraud. 
 
ESTABLISH PHYSICAL CONTROLS FOR THE COMPUTERS USED FOR WIRES AND ACH/EDI 
TRANSFERS. Do not allow any more access to these terminals than you would to pre-printed 
check stock. Secure the terminals to their desks by locking devices; restrict access to the work area 
where the equipment is housed; and provide lock-and-key safety for backup copies of tapes and disks 
supporting the money transfer systems. 
 
USE ACCESS CODES WITH YOUR TREASURY SYSTEMS. Secure passwords (if used), and 
require a minimum of 6 frequently changed characters. Do not allow passwords to be 
shared or to be posted in accessible areas. Do not allow unlimited attempts to sign-on. If you do, a 
computer hacker will eventually discover your password. Instead, allow three tries, after which the 
user is logged off and access is forbidden. 
 
CONSIDER PROHIBITING TELEPHONE OR OTHER MANUAL WIRES, due to the significant 
opportunity for fraud. Establish repetitive wire transfers whenever possible, designating 
specific accounts and codes involved in the transfer. If manual wires must be used, limit usage to 
funds movement between bank accounts. Do not allow facsimile (fax) signature authority for 
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electronic transactions, as a legitimate signature could be pasted onto a fraudulent transfer request. 
Insist on "wet" (ink signed) signature approvals. 
 
ESTABLISH A SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR TO MANAGE USER ACCESS. The responsibilities of a 
security administrator would include issuing/changing user identification codes, receiving 
test material, handling changes to the system as initiated by the bank or by you, assigning transaction 
limitations, etc. To maintain a complete separation of functions, the security administrator should not 
have transaction authority to the payment systems. 
REVIEW ALL PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE TRANSMISSION OR DELIVERY OF DATA TAPES OR 
DISKS. To prevent fraudulent media from being substituted for the original documents, 
require all movement to be in locked bags. Do not allow a delivery person to have access to the bag. 
 
 
The Risk of Fraud: Outsourcing 
 
Banks and vendors of financial services are expert at managing the risk of fraud, given their vast 
experience with the requirements of their own organizations. Most outsourcing products cannot be 
provided by companies at or even near the level of expertise, given the significant fixed costs and 
technology required. These outsourcing actions can help to manage paper transaction fraud: 
 
For Paper Transactions: 
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USE OF POSITIVE (MATCH) PAY. Positive or match pay is a daily reconciliation product, as 
compared to the monthly full account reconciliation described in Chapter 8. It involves the 
transmission of an organization's issued check file to the bank, including check number and amount. 
As items are deposited and returned through the banking system and presented for clearing, any item 
where there is not a match of either factor is referred to the issuer for approval or rejection. The 
issuer normally has about one-half a business day to make this decision. This product prevents the 
honoring of checks pulled fraudulently from the bottom of a stack of pre-printed checks, and checks 
altered after issuance. 
 
Positive pay works when checks are deposited and clear through the banking system for credit to the 
depositor's account. If a fraudulent check is cashed, as might occur with a payroll check, positive pay 
will not prevent a loss to the bank and/or to the corporate issuer. Desktop technology has created the 
opportunity for forgerers to scan a corporate logo and an executive signature from an annual report or 
other public document.  
 
The company's bank account data may be obtained from various sources, including contacting the 
company and asking for the bank account number on the excuse that money is to be wired in 
payment of an invoice. The phoney checks are cashed, often by gangs operating in a team on a single 
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community, who then leave town before the loss is discovered.2 
 
                               
2See "Bank Fraud, The Old-Fashioned Way," Business Week, Sept. 4, 1995, page 96. 
In response to these frauds with payroll checks, companies are emphasizing direct deposit programs 
(see Chapter 8). Another strategy is to encourage banks to fingerprint or "triple identify" non-
customers attempting to cash checks. (A triple identification involves proof of identity through a 
driver's license and two credit cards.) 
 
OUTSOURCE THE HANDLING OF CHECKS RECEIVED TO A BANK LOCKBOX. Theft may occur 
when checks are received in an office and a deposit ticket is prepared. This is a particular 
problem if the same individuals have responsibility for cash management and cash application. 
Regardless of float issues, consider having a bank lockbox (discussed in Chapter 6) handle the entire 
transaction flow, with any check disappearance the liability of the bank. 
 
SET LIMITS ON WIRES AND ACH/EDI TRANSFERS for each transaction, for files of 
transactions, and for settlement day totals. Determine if your bank has software which can 
review a set of transactions to determine if these limits are exceeded, so that you can be notified. 
Consider positive or match-pay systems, which provide receiving banks with lists of authorized 
transactions against which an ACH/EDI file is compared.  
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For Electronic Transactions: 
 
CONSIDER ENCRYPTION AND AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY 
OF ACH/EDI TRANSACTIONS. Encryption involves the scrambling of data into unreadable 
cipher. Authentication provides protection against the tampering of data by detecting any deletion, 
insertion or modification. Both technologies involve the use of algorithms and secret keys known 
only known to the company and the bank. 
 
INVESTIGATE THE USE OF SMART CARDS which frequently revise access codes and require 
PINs (personal identification numbers), similar to ATM cards. This technology requires  
the card entries of these codes to be verified by the host computer, allowing transactions to proceed if 
matches occur for the ones expected at that exact time of day. 
 
ENCOURAGE YOUR BANK TO USE ELECTRONIC CHECK PRESENTMENT (ECP) to speed 
notification of NSF or dishonored checks. There are two components to ECP: electronic 
cash letter presentment to your bank (versus the physical delivery of clearing items), and access to 
comprehensive electronic data bases of known bad check writers and closed accounts.  
 
  
The Management of Information Risk 
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An often overlooked source of risk is information risk, that is, the risk of a loss of data critical to the 
operation of business activities. The dissemination of data throughout computing facilities and files 
makes regular back-up and protection difficult to control, and the proliferation of internal and 
external data sources adds significant complexity to this process. There is a large potential impact 
from a loss of proprietary business data. 
 
There was a time not so long ago when all internal data was generated by a single mainframe system, 
 making it a relatively simple matter to monitor access to the computer system to assure data 
integrity. Today, there are numerous internal data systems, including mainframe, minis and PCs, 
some stand-alone and some on LANs. External data used regularly by companies now includes bank 
information reporting, EDI feeds from VANs, on-line purchasing systems, the Internet, and various 
other types of interfaces.  
 
Exposure to hackers, viruses, accidents and intentional destruction has risen significantly, and few 
companies have developed procedures to deal with the resulting information risk. To protect your 
organization: 
 
CAREFULLY REVIEW THE DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAMS OF YOUR BANKS. Make certain 
that there are specific back-up and security procedures for data, that an alternative is 
available for processing in the event that the main site fails, and that a vendor has been contracted to 
provide further back-up in the event of a catastrophe.  
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DEVELOP BACK-UP PROCEDURES FOR ALL INTERNAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, including stand-
alone and LAN (local area network) PCs. Don't forget laptop users! Create a secure library 
for all file back-ups, and make certain that every system is periodically represented using sign-in 
diaries or logs. 
 
ANALYZE YOUR ORGANIZATION'S EMERGENCY PLANNING .  Determine which tasks are 
essential for corporate survival, and develop procedures to accomplish those activities in 
the event that access is denied to offices or plant locations. Are the necessary files and equipment 
available to accomplish those tasks, and is an alternative office available? 
 
PUBLISH A PROTECTION PLAN for your organization, distribute it to all affected managers 
and business units, and test it periodically to determine any flaws or oversights. Include in 
the plan such basic information as the home, automobile and beeper telephone numbers of key 
managers, and the critical tasks required to be performed to maintain the integrity of the 
organization. 
 
REMEMBER THAT ELECTRONIC DATA HAVE VALUE AS BOTH A SOURCE OF FUNDS AND AS 
INFORMATION to a competitor or "reseller". Most controls are oriented to the protection of 
funds, while overlooking the possibility of the diversion of proprietary data for unethical uses. 
Protection must be developed for both sources of value, as well as for paper receipts and 
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disbursements. Your banks should be able to provide information on the security methods 
appropriate to the needs of your organization. 
 
 
Using Policies to Manage Risk 
The development and publication of policies and procedures on financial matters should supplement 
internal actions and outsourcing initiatives. Policies and procedures manuals are standard in 
specifying internal accounting rules, but only a small number of organizations have extended the 
process to other disciplines. Formal policies and procedures should be considered for various 
financial areas, as listed in Table 10-1. 
 
 
 
 Table 10-1: Cashflow Policies and Specific Topic Areas 
 
 
General Policy and 
Rationale 
 
 
Subject of Policy 
 
 
Topics Covered by Policy 
 
Liability Management: 
 
Use of credit and debt 
 
Monitoring of borrowings 
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to protect the credit 
rating of the business 
capacity, including 
management of total 
commitments 
Relationships with credit rating 
 agencies 
Use of derivatives 
 
Investment 
Management: to 
establish guidelines for 
the selection and 
custody of investments 
 
Statement regarding 
appropriate investments, 
including levels of risk, 
maturities, criteria for 
investment firms handling 
securities, and other 
activities 
 
Criteria of acceptable investments 
Securities lending 
Custody of securities 
Transaction processing standards 
 
 
Bank Relations 
Management: to specify 
responsibilities for 
interface with banks 
 
Statement regarding 
managers responsible for 
bank contacts, including the 
assignment of specific 
activities 
 
Establishing bank relations 
Opening/closing accounts 
Signature authorizations 
Monitoring bank quality  
 
Liquidity Management: 
to provide for adequate 
 
Establishment of appropriate 
levels of working capital and 
 
Cash collection procedures 
Cash concentration procedures 
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liquidity for the 
business 
short-term cash Cash disbursement procedures 
 
Information 
Management: to limit 
the potential loss of 
important data 
 
Establishment of procedures 
to safeguard and recover 
data critical to the mission of 
the business 
 
Internal and vendor disaster       
recovery programs 
Systems backup procedures 
Emergency planning 
Control of access to proprietary data 
 
International 
Transactions: to 
manage international 
transactions and funds 
 
Establishment of guidelines 
to control the impact of 
currency fluctuations 
including exposure limits 
 
Cash activities for international 
 currencies 
Hedging currency risk 
International money transfer 
 
Code of Conduct: to 
publish an ethics 
statement regarding 
employee behavior 
 
Statement on employee 
conduct in accordance with 
legal and regulatory 
requirements and corporate 
policies 
 
List of situations which are 
inappropriate, illegal or unethical; 
e.g., soliciting gifts from vendors or 
customers, trading on insider 
information, nepotism, etc. 
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The publication of policies, and perhaps the specific procedures for each policy, can protect the 
organization from the activities of a foolish rogue or someone with evil intentions. The statement of 
acceptable levels of risk permit the periodic monitoring of compliance and the initiation of any 
necessary corrective actions. 
 
Case: Managing the Risk of Derivatives 
 
Managers have become alert to the risks from the losses on derivatives contracts, and some, like 
Gibson Greetings, Federal Paper Board and Orange County, CA, have major financial debacles on 
their hands.3 Corporations and governments have been seriously harmed by betting on the direction 
of interest rates through the use of swaps, swaptions, other interest-rate contracts, and currency 
derivatives.  A leading example is the dispute between Bankers Trust and Proctor & Gamble, the 
heart of which is whether the bank made oral representations as to the risk in the financing chosen to 
replace an expiring swap.  
 
Derivatives are based on financial instruments, used fixed or floating rate debt (such as commercial 
paper or U.S. Treasury Bonds). A swap exchanges future cash flows between parties for a future 
period, such as fixed interest rate debt swapped for floating interest rates (or vice-versa). There are 
                               
3This is considered as financial risk, and is discussed more thoroughly in an Appendix to 
this chapter.  
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numerous variations of derivatives, including caps or limits on rates at which swaps are exercised. 
 
According to published reports, Proctor & Gamble (P&G) was presented with three alternatives, one 
of which involved a wager on the direction of both short- and long-term interest rates. The company 
selected a swap based on yields on Five Year U.S. Treasury Notes and Thirty Year Treasury Bonds, 
even though internal valuations and the bank's pricing model were never disclosed. With the Federal 
Reserve boosting rates throughout 1994, the cost of terminating the swap rose over 14% above the 
interest rate on commercial paper, or a total of $195 million. P&G and Bankers Trust settled the 
matter before going to trial, with the bank accepting the largest share of the loss.  
 
There were two mistakes made by the parties in this set of transactions. First, finance is always a 
staff function, not a profit center, and any transaction must support an inherent goal of the that 
function, such as reducing interest costs or exchanging fixed rate debt for floating rate.  Finance 
should not be expected to make target transaction profits. Second, any financial transaction requires 
full disclosure of all pricing models and other elements which drive the deal's valuation. 
 
 
 
Elements of a Policies and Procedures Statement 
 
In order to prevent such problems, organizations should develop and issue policies regarding 
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appropriate behavior and acceptable risk. This approach is similar to policies developed by many 
treasurers regarding the opening of bank accounts, the execution of money transfers, and other 
sensitive matters, and involves: 
 
 a statement as to acceptable practice 
 levels of management permitted to commit the organization to specific levels of exposure 
 penalties for violation of the policy 
 responsibility for enforcement 
 
Such policies should be distributed to internal staff and to investment and commercial bankers, with 
a signed copy retained by the issuer. Of course, there is no standard set of policies and procedures 
which apply to all organizations, because of the variance in the degree of risk acceptance;  for 
example, some organizations will have a greater appetite for the use of derivatives than others.  
 
For example, a policy on derivatives might state the following: 
 
Rationale. Treasury supports the strategic business goals of the organization, and is not chartered to 
accept unreasonable financial risk. 
 
Definitions of terms used: A derivative is a financial instrument which is derived from another, more 
basic financial instrument, with the value of the derivative based on that more elementary instrument. 
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Policy. No derivative contract may be executed which contains risk from the future direction of both 
short- and long-term interest rates, or involves a level of exposure greater than ½% point (50 bp) or 
other predetermined level ascertained by fully disclosed valuations. 
 
Authority to Commit. The following managers are authorized to commit this organization to a 
derivative contract: the Treasurer or the Chief Financial Officer. 
 
Penalties for Violation. Any employee found in violation of this policy is subject to immediate 
dismissal. Any bank or vendor involved in a transaction in violation of this policy will be barred 
from doing business with this organization for five years.  
 
Enforcement. This policy will be enforced by Internal Audit staff, with advice from the Law 
Department. 
 
While most organizations publish policies and procedures and distribute copies, employees too often 
have only a cursory knowledge of their content. Successful implementation -- and the avoidance of 
unacceptable financial risk -- requires that all parties sign a statement indicating that the policy has 
been read and understood. Furthermore, to assure adherence, there should be periodic independent 
audits of activities involving risk. The management of risk requires that organizational policies be 
established, that employees and vendors are aware of those policies, and that penalties are adequate 
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to assure compliance. 
 
 
Triage for Business Risk 
 
It is prudent to assume that your organization will be attacked by fraud, theft  or system failure, or 
that a natural calamity, such as a flood or fire, will occur. You could be temporarily unable to 
conduct your normal business activities. Take steps now to assure that such a situation does not 
become a permanent closing! 
 
The management of risk is a critical element in the life of an organization. Businesses and 
government have failed (or defaulted) because of a breakdown in the necessary surveillance of the 
various risks which can undermine corporate security. Certain internal actions are appropriate to 
mitigate risk; in other situations, outsourcing may be the appropriate choice. 
